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This paper investigates the e⁄ect of monopoly subsidies on entry deterrence. We consider
a potential entrant who observes two signals: the subsidy set by the regulator and the output
level produced by the incumbent ￿rm. We show that not only a separating equilibrium can be
supported, where information about the incumbent￿ s costs is conveyed to the entrant, but also
a pooling equilibrium, where the actions of regulator and incumbent conceal the monopolist￿ s
type, thus deterring entry. We demonstrate that the regulator strategically designs subsidies
to facilitate, or hinder, entry deterrence, depending on which outcome yields the largest social
welfare. Furthermore, we compare equilibrium welfare relative to two benchmarks: complete
information environments, and standard entry-deterrence games where the regulator is absent.
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11 Introduction
Several monopolized industries often bene￿t from subsidies allowing them to increase their output
levels. For instance, Monsanto sells more than 70% of genetically modi￿ed seeds in the U.S. and
has consistently received subsidies from the USDA.1 Similarly, the Korean steel company Posco,
which until 1992 had monopoly status for many of its products in the domestic market, also received
output-related subsidies.2 In the context of U.S. commercial airlines, Goldsbee and Syverson (2008)
empirically show that some airlines, initially operating as monopolies in the route between two
cities, decide to signi￿cantly reduce prices in order to prevent entry. Despite their entry-deterring
behavior, commercial airlines have recurrently bene￿ted from output-related subsidies.3 Finally,
the industry of electricity production is often regarded as a regional monopoly in many states across
the U.S. and ￿rms in this sector have also received generous federal and state subsidies to increase
production.4
Despite their widespread use, the regulation literature has overlooked the informative content
that subsidies provide to potential entrants. In this paper, we demonstrate that subsidy policy
can help the incumbent ￿rm conceal information from potential entrants, thus hindering entry and
competition under certain conditions. In addition, we show that subsidies can be welfare improving,
despite their negative e⁄ect on entry. Our results, hence, suggest that the regulator strategically
designs subsidies to reveal or conceal information, depending on which outcome yields the largest
social welfare.
We examine an entry-deterrence game in which a regulator provides a per-unit subsidy in each
period. In particular, we consider settings where the incumbent ￿rm has been recently privatized
after being publicly owned and managed for several years, allowing the regulator to accumulate
information about the incumbent￿ s costs.5 In this context, the potential entrant, being uninformed
1In particular, the USDA Federal Crop Insurance Corporation o⁄ers signi￿cant insurance discounts (about $2 per
acre, or $2,000 for a typical 1,000-acre farm) to farmers who plant 75-80% of their crops using Monsanto￿ s genetically
modi￿ed seeds. Importantly, these insurance discounts are not o⁄ered to farmers using genetically modi￿ed seeds
from other ￿rms.
2For instance, the Korean government provided Posco with discounted user rates for many government services,
such as discounted railroad rate of 40%, port rate of 50%, water-supply rate of 30%, and gas rate of 20%. For more
details on the subsidies to Posco, see Amsden (1989) and Park (2003).
3As part of the Essential Air Service program, the U.S. Department of Transportation provides output-related
subsidies to airlines serving 152 rural communities across the country. These companies frequently maintain a
monopolistic position on this type of routes and receive subsidies from this program which, in certain ￿ ights, can
reach an average of $74 per passenger; see Bailey (2006).
4According to Slocum (2007), for instance, 92% of U.S. households have no ability to choose an alternative
electricity supplier, since the wholesale market of power generation is essentially monopolized. Federal subsidies
directly related to electricity production were estimated at $6.7 billion in 2007, or about 41% of total energy subsidies;
see EIA (2008).
5Several public companies were privatized in the United Kingdom, such as British Steel (privatized in 1988), and
British Energy (in 1996). Other examples include Petro-Canada (1991) and Nova Scotia Power (1992) in Canada. In
addition, many planned economies have also experienced major privatization processes, such as Russia with LUKOil
(1995) and Novolipetsk Steel (1995). Many of these ￿rms still receive generous subsidies, such as LUKOil, the largest
oil producer in Russia, which bene￿ted from a large share of the US$100 billion in subsidies directed to fossil-fuel
producers in 2009, IEA (2010). For accounts of these privatization processes, see Kay and Thompson (1986) and
Waterson (1988). Finally, China has recently started to privatize some public companies, as reported by the OECD
(2009) and Gan et al. (2012).
2about the incumbent￿ s costs, observes two signals to assess market prospects: the incumbent￿ s
output level, as in standard entry-deterrence games, but also the subsidy set by the regulator. As
a consequence, we study a new role of subsidies since, in addition to their standard goal to induce
e¢ cient output levels, they can be used as a tool to facilitate the transmission of information, thus
promoting or deterring entry.6
The paper shows the existence of two types of equilibrium outcomes: a separating equilibrium,
where information about the incumbent￿ s costs is fully revealed to the entrant, and a pooling
equilibrium, where such information is concealed. In the separating equilibrium, the actions of
both informed agents (regulator and incumbent) convey the incumbent￿ s type to the entrant, i.e.,
they both choose the same type-dependent strategies as under complete information. Hence, the
presence of an additional signal (originating from the regulator) induces players to behave as under
complete information contexts, entailing a similar welfare level; a non-distortionary result in the
line of models in which the entrant observes signals stemming from two incumbent ￿rms, such as
Bagwell and Ramey (1991) and Schultz (1999).
The non-distortionary ￿nding, however, di⁄ers from that in standard entry-deterrence games
in which the regulator is absent. In particular, these models predict that social welfare in the
separating equilibrium can be larger than in complete information if the welfare gain associated to
￿rst-period overproduction o⁄sets the incumbent￿ s pro￿t loss from exerting a separating e⁄ort. Our
results, in contrast, suggest that equilibrium behavior with regulation coincides in both information
contexts, thus yielding the same welfare. Nevertheless, this ￿nding does not imply that the regu-
lator￿ s presence in a setting of incomplete information is welfare neutral. Instead, the regulator￿ s
ability to induce optimal output levels during both periods produces a positive e⁄ect on welfare;
ultimately yielding an unambiguously larger welfare than in signaling games where the regulator is
absent.
In the pooling equilibrium, in contrast, both regulator and incumbent￿ s actions conceal informa-
tion from the entrant (they select type-independent strategies), thus deterring entry. In particular,
the high-cost incumbent increases its output ￿ in order to mimic the low-cost incumbent, i.e., it
￿overproduces￿ ￿ while the regulator provides the subsidy corresponding to the low-cost incum-
bent, i.e., he ￿over-subsidizes.￿By setting such a subsidy, the regulator gives rise to negative and
positive welfare e⁄ects: on one hand, he induces the production of an ine¢ cient output level but,
on the other hand, entry is deterred, thus entailing savings in entry costs. As a consequence, the
6The case of Dow Chemicals, a monopolist in the U.S. magnesium industry, provides evidence of entry-deterring
practices facilitated by regulation. Regulators accumulated information about Dow￿ s production during the Korean
War, a period in which magnesium production plants were publicly owned and managed. In 1970, the EPA introduced
the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS), a⁄ecting the emission of two pollutants generated in the
production of magnesium: carbon monoxide and particulate matter. The following year, however, the state of Texas,
where most Dow magnesium plants were located, passed its own Clean Air Act, allowing Dow to ignore some of
the emission requirements in the NAAQS. Such state law can, hence, be interpreted as an output subsidy to Dow.
Interestingly, this implicit subsidy led Dow to substantially increase its magnesium production during the early
1970s, which successfully deterred the entry of potential competitors, such as Kaiser Aluminum and Norsk Hydro;
and delayed the entry of Alcoa until 1976. For more details, see Lieberman (1987), Rosenbaum (1998) and Friedrich
and Mordike (2006).
3regulator is only willing to ￿over-subsidize￿when the savings in entry costs o⁄set the welfare loss
that arises from overproduction; a loss that diminishes in the weight assigned on consumer surplus.
In this setting, regulator￿ s and incumbent￿ s preferences are aligned and, hence, the former supports
the ￿rm￿ s entry-deterring practices. In contrast, their preferences about entry are misaligned if
suboptimal subsidies generate large welfare losses. In this case, the regulator prefers to behave as
under complete information, which reveals information to potential entrants, thus hindering the
incumbent￿ s ability to deter entry.
We furthermore show that the pooling equilibrium is more likely to emerge when ￿rms￿costs
are symmetric, i.e., the di⁄erence between a high- and low-cost incumbent is small. Speci￿cally,
the welfare loss that arises from the incumbent￿ s mimicking e⁄ort diminishes as costs become
symmetric, thus expanding the set of parameters under which this equilibrium can be sustained.
From a policy perspective, this result suggests that policies that support ine¢ cient ￿rms in their
acquisition of more advanced technologies would actually facilitate the concealment of information
from potential entrants, further promoting entry deterrence.
Our ￿ndings, hence, show that regulatory agencies can strategically facilitate or inhibit the
entry-deterring practices of established ￿rms, depending on which equilibrium outcome yields the
largest social welfare. In particular, they highlight the informative role of government subsidies, an
element often ignored when designing or evaluating subsidy programs to monopolized industries.
While these programs might entail entry-deterring consequences, our results demonstrate that their
welfare e⁄ects might be positive.
Related literature. Our paper contributes to the literature on monopoly regulation where
the social planner has accurate information about the incumbent￿ s costs, extended by Baron and
Myerson (1982) to contexts where the regulator does not observe the incumbent￿ s costs, and further
developed by La⁄ont and Tirole (1986) and Lewis and Sappington (1989).7 Unlike these articles,
however, we consider a setting where a regulated monopolist faces the threat of entry in the next
period. In the complete information game, we show that monopoly subsidies cannot be used
to deter entry, since the entry decision solely depends on the incumbent￿ s e¢ ciency level.8 Under
incomplete information, however, monopoly subsidies can be used to convey or conceal information,
thus a⁄ecting entry in the industry.
Our paper also connects to entry-deterrence models where the regulator is absent; see Milgrom
and Roberts (1982), Harrington (1986), and Ridley (2008). Unlike these studies, we analyze ￿rms￿
actions within a standard regulatory framework, and investigate the e⁄ects of regulation on entry-
deterrence and competition. Since the uninformed entrant observes two signals, our model relates
to the signaling literature that considers industries in which the uninformed party observes several
7In particular, La⁄ont and Tirole (1986) consider the e⁄ects of distortive taxation on optimal regulation, showing
the existence of a trade-o⁄ between the information rent of the regulated ￿rm and e¢ ciency. Lewis and Sappington
(1989) extend the Baron-Myerson model by having the regulator not only uninformed about a ￿rm￿ s marginal cost
but also about its ￿xed costs, the latter being negatively correlated with the former.
8In a setting where the regulator strategically selects trade and subsidy policy, Dixit and Kyle (1985) show that
a perfectly-informed regulator can a⁄ect the entry decision of foreign ￿rms. Their paper, however, does not analyze
the signaling role of subsidy policy.
4signals, originating from either one or multiple senders. Milgrom and Roberts (1986), for instance,
analyze an informed ￿rm who uses two signals, price and advertising, to convey the quality of its
product to potential customers.9 While we also study information transmission with two signals, in
our model they stem from two di⁄erent informed agents (the regulator and the incumbent), rather
than from the same player. We demonstrate that, in contrast to their results, the presence of two
informed agents can support the emergence of a pooling equilibrium in which information about
the incumbent￿ s costs is concealed from the entrant, thus deterring entry.
This paper is, hence, closer to entry-deterrence models in which the uninformed player observes
signals originating from di⁄erent senders; such as Harrington (1987), and Bagwell and Ramey
(1991), who study the use of limit pricing by two incumbent ￿rms with common private informa-
tion about their production costs.10;11 Our analysis is specially connected to Schultz￿ s (1999) study
of entry deterrence in markets where two incumbent ￿rms have opposing interests regarding entry.
He ￿nds that, while a non-distortionary separating equilibrium exists, in which players￿behav-
ior coincides with that under complete information, a pooling equilibrium can also be supported,
whereby ￿rms￿signals conceal information about market demand from the entrant, thus deterring
it from the industry. This pooling equilibrium emerges when the interests of both ￿rms are similar.
We likewise show that such equilibrium arises when the regulator￿ s and incumbent￿ s preferences
are aligned. Our paper, furthermore, shows that such equilibrium, despite deterring entry, unam-
biguously entails a welfare improvement relative to complete information.12 By contrast, if their
preferences are misaligned, subsidy policy inhibits the incumbent￿ s concealment of information, and
entry occurs.13
9Bagwell and Ramey (1990) and Albaek and Overgaard (1994) also examine entry deterrence in a model where
the potential entrant can perfectly observe both the incumbent￿ s pre-entry pricing strategy and its advertising ex-
penditures.
10Martin (1995) considers an industry where two incumbent ￿rms might have di⁄erent, rather than common,
production costs, which each of them privately observes. He shows that each incumbent￿ s incentives to signal its own
production cost to its rival and to the potential entrant allow for the emergence of pooling strategy pro￿les under
conditions that did not support this type of equilibrium when all ￿rms share the same production cost.
11These models also relate to the literature that examines industries in which two or more ￿rms use two signals,
price and expenditure on uninformative advertising, to convey their product quality to uninformed consumers; as in
Hertzendorf and Overgaard (2001) and Fluet and Garella (2002), which extend Milgrom and Robert￿ s (1986) model to
two ￿rms. Daughety and Reinganum (2007) further develop such information setting in two respects: ￿rst, allowing
for each ￿rm to privately observe the quality of its own product, rather than assuming that both ￿rms can observe
each others￿qualities and, second, considering that consumers can have di⁄erent preferences for the good that each
￿rm o⁄ers. For other recent models analyzing ￿rms￿signal of their product quality, see Daughety and Reinganum
(2008) and Levin, Peck and Ye (2009).
12Espinola-Arredondo and Munoz-Garcia (2012) examine a similar information setting, whereby a polluting ￿rm
faces the threat of entry. Their paper, however, focuses on how the incumbent￿ s overproduction decision, in order to
deter entry, generates more pollution, which gives rise to an additional form of ine¢ ciency, absent under complete
information, ultimately calling for a stricter environmental policy.
13In the ￿eld of capital-structure decisions, Gertner et al. (1988) analyze an enlarged entry deterrence model
where an informed ￿rm sends a signal about its pro￿tability to two uninformed audiences: the capital and product
market. In particular, Gertner et al. (1988) show that the emergence of the separating or pooling equilibrium in the
capital market critically depends on whether the incumbent is interested in revealing or concealing her type to the
product market. Hence, the occurrence of separating or pooling equilibria is endogenous. Similarly, in our paper, the
emergence of the separating or pooling equilibrium depends on whether the regulator seeks to attract or deter entry,
respectively.
5The next section describes the model under complete information. Section 3 examines the
signaling game and sections 4 and 5 analyze the separating and pooling equilibrium, respectively,
also providing welfare comparisons. We then discuss our equilibrium results, as well as policy
implications, and section 6 concludes.
2 Complete information
Let us examine an entry game where a monopolist incumbent initially operates and an entrant
must decide whether or not to join the market. In addition, consider a regulator who sets a subsidy
per unit of output in every stage of the game. This section analyzes the case where all players are
informed about the incumbent￿ s marginal cost, while sections 3-5 examine the case in which the
entrant is unable to observe such a cost. We study a two-stage game where, in the ￿rst stage, the
regulator selects a subsidy s1 and the monopolist responds by maximizing its pro￿ts,
max
q
(1 ￿ q)q ￿ (cK
inc ￿ s1)q
where cK
inc denotes the incumbent￿ s marginal costs for any type K = fH;Lg, 1 > cH
inc > cL
inc ￿ 0,
and P(q) = 1 ￿ q is the inverse market demand. In the second stage, a potential entrant decides
whether or not to join. The regulator then revises his subsidy policy s2 and, if entry occurs, ￿rms
compete as Cournot duopolists, simultaneously selecting production levels xinc and xent, for the
incumbent and entrant, respectively. Otherwise, the incumbent maintains its monopoly power
during both periods. In addition, the entrant￿ s marginal cost, cent, coincides with that of the high-
cost incumbent, since it lack experience in the industry.14 The entrant must incur a ￿xed entry
cost F > 0 which induces entry when the incumbent￿ s costs are high, but deters it when they are
low. Finally, the regulator￿ s social welfare function in the ￿rst period is
SW = ￿CS(q) + (1 ￿ ￿)[PS(q) ￿ s1q];
where CS(q) (PS(q)) denotes consumer surplus (producer surplus, respectively), s1q is the gov-
ernment￿ s total expenditure on subsidies, and ￿ represents the weight that the regulator assigns to
consumer surplus. The second term, thus, reduces to (1 ￿ q)q ￿ cK
incq. For compactness, let us use
the normalization ￿ ￿ ￿=(1 ￿ ￿), where ￿ represents the relative weight on consumer surplus, and
￿ 2 [0;1]. Social welfare, hence, simpli￿es to ￿CS(q) + (1 ￿ q)q ￿ cK
incq.15 A similar social welfare
function applies to the second-period game. We next describe output and subsidies in the subgame
perfect equilibrium of the game.




inc. If it does
not bene￿t, its costs are c
H
inc.
15The subsidy in our model is hence ￿nanced with non-distortionary taxes, as in Dixit and Kyle (1985). Otherwise,
the marginal cost of raising public funds should enter into the regulator￿ s social welfare function. Section 5.1 discusses
that this consideration would shrink the set of parameter values sustaining some of our equilibrium results.
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and the incumbent responds with an output function qK(s1) =
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3 where i = finc;entg and j 6= i. In addition, subsidies and the resulting output











which is increasing in the weight on consumer surplus, ￿, and decreasing in the incumbent￿ s costs,
cK
inc. Therefore, the subsidy that induces this output level is also increasing in ￿ and decreasing
in cK
inc. Note that when the regulator assigns no weight to consumers, ￿ = 0, output level qK
SO
coincides with that of an unregulated monopoly, i.e.,
1￿cK
inc
2 , whereas when ￿ = 1, the socially
optimal output qK
SO becomes the perfectly competitive output 1 ￿ cK
inc.
Upon entry, the regulator seeks to induce the same socially optimal output at the aggregate
level. In this case, however, subsidy s
K;E





since aggregate output under duopoly is closer to the social optimum. In addition, the duopoly
subsidy when the incumbent￿ s costs are high, s
H;E
2 , is positive for ￿ > 1=2, yielding a positive
output for both ￿rms. Since we aim at investigating the e⁄ects of subsidies on entry patterns, we
hereafter focus on positive subsidies, i.e., ￿ > 1=2.16
Therefore, under complete information subsidy policy cannot be used by the regulator to pro-
mote or hinder entry, since the entry decision solely depends on the incumbent￿ s costs. Under
incomplete information, however, we next show that the informative content of subsidies can be
used as a tool to deter entry.
3 Signaling
Let us now analyze the case where the incumbent and regulator are privately informed about the
incumbent￿ s marginal costs. This information context describes settings where the social planner
has accumulated information about the incumbent￿ s cost structure over time, e.g., publicly managed
monopolies that were recently privatized. The entrant, however, does not observe the incumbent￿ s
cost and, hence, bases its entry decision on the observed ￿rst-period output level and subsidy. The
time structure of this signaling game is as follows.17
16If, in contrast, ￿ < 1=2, the subsidy would become zero, and ￿rms would produce the standard duopoly output.
17To facilitate the comparison of our results with those of the literature on entry-deterrence games, e.g., Milgrom
and Roberts (1982), we consider a similar information setting and time structure, whereby the incumbent￿ s costs are
71. Nature decides the realization of the incumbent￿ s marginal costs, either high or low, with
probabilities p 2 (0;1) and 1 ￿ p, respectively. Incumbent and regulator privately observe
this realization but the entrant does not.
2. The regulator sets a ￿rst-period subsidy s1 and the incumbent responds choosing its ￿rst-
period output level, q(s1).
3. Observing the pair of signals (s1;q(s1)), the entrant forms beliefs about the incumbent￿ s mar-
ginal costs. Let ￿(cH
incjq(s1);s1) denote the entrant￿ s posterior belief about the incumbent￿ s
costs being high.
4. Given these beliefs, the entrant decides whether or not to enter the industry.
5. If entry does not occur, the regulator sets a second-period subsidy, s
K;NE





2 ). If, in contrast, entry ensues, the entrant observes the
incumbent￿ s costs and the regulator sets a second-period subsidy s
K;E
2 . Both ￿rms then









Hence, step 5 implies that information is revealed after entry and all agents behave as under
complete information. As a consequence, we hereafter focus on the informative role of ￿rst-period
actions, as described in steps 1-4. For compactness, let DK
ent denote the entrant￿ s duopoly pro￿ts
in equilibrium evaluated at subsidy s
K;E
2 when the entrant faces a K-type incumbent. As speci￿ed
in the previous section, entry is unpro￿table when the incumbent￿ s costs are low, whereas it is
pro￿table when costs are high, i.e., DH
ent > F > DL
ent, where F is the ￿xed entry cost.
3.1 Beliefs upon observing two signals
Since the potential entrant observes two signals (subsidy level and output) originating from two
di⁄erent agents, the speci￿cation of its beliefs are more intricate than in standard entry-deterrence
games. In particular, we assume that beliefs must meet the following consistency requirements.
Consider a separating strategy pro￿le in which the regulator facing a high(low)-cost ￿rm se-
lects sH
1 (sL
1) and the incumbent responds with output level qH(sH
1 ) (qL(sL
1), respectively). In this
setting, if the entrant observes an equilibrium strategy pair (sH
1 ;qH(sH
1 )), it believes that the in-
cumbent￿ s costs must be high, i.e., ￿(cH
incjqH(sH
1 );sH
1 ) = 1, and enters; while after (sL
1;qL(sL
1)), the
entrant￿ s beliefs are ￿(cH
incjqL(sL
1);sL
1) = 0, and stays out, where (sH
1 ;qH(sH
1 )) 6= (sL
1;qL(sL
1)). Let
us now examine o⁄-the-equilibrium beliefs. First, if the regulator chooses an equilibrium subsidy sH
1
but the incumbent deviates to an o⁄-the-equilibrium output q(sH
1 ), where q(sH
1 ) 6= qH(sH
1 );qL(sH
1 ),
the entrant only relies on the signal of the non-deviating player (the regulator). Following the
notion of ￿unprejudiced beliefs￿by Bagwell and Ramey (1991) and Schultz (1999), we assume that
the entrant￿ s beliefs are compatible with the strategy selected by the non-deviating player, and





1 ) = 1, thus attracting entry.18 Analogously, after strategy pair (s1;qK(s1)),
in which the regulator now selects the o⁄-the-equilibrium subsidy s1, where s1 6= sH
1 ;sL
1, but the
incumbent responds with equilibrium strategies, the entrant bases its entry decision on the incum-
bent￿ s signal alone, i.e., ￿(cH
incjqH(s1);s1) = 1 and ￿(cH
incjqL(s1);s1) = 0. Second, if the regulator
sets an equilibrium subsidy of sH
1 , but the high-cost incumbent imitates the output function of the
low-cost ￿rm, qL(s), the entrant observes equilibrium signals corresponding to two di⁄erent types of
incumbents. In this case, the entrant is in the dark: is the deviation originating from the high-cost
incumbent, who mimics the output function of the low-cost ￿rm, qL(s1), in order to deter entry?
Or, is it coming from a regulator facing a low-cost incumbent, who chooses sH
1 in order to attract
entry? According to unprejudiced beliefs, the entrant cannot discern the incumbent￿ s costs with
certainty, and thus cannot assign full probability to either type, i.e., ￿(cH
incjqL(sH
1 );sH
1 ) = ￿0 2 (0;1).
Finally, when both regulator and incumbent select type-independent strategies, the entrant cannot
update its beliefs upon observing subsidies and output, and the use of unprejudiced beliefs does
not restrict the entrant￿ s beliefs. Hence, we apply the Cho and Kreps￿(1983) Intuitive Criterion to
limit the set of pooling equilibria with reasonable beliefs.19
The following section focuses on strategy pro￿les where both regulator and incumbent select
type-dependent strategies and, thus, private information is conveyed to the entrant. Because both
informed agents choose separating strategies, we refer to this type of pro￿les as two-sided sepa-
rating equilibria (TSSE). Afterwards, we analyze those pro￿les where only one agent, either the
regulator or the incumbent, chooses a type-dependent strategy, which we refer as one-sided sepa-
rating equilibria (OSSE). Finally, we analyze strategy pro￿les in which both incumbent and entrant
select type-independent strategies, i.e., pooling equilibria, and thus the entrant cannot infer the
incumbent￿ s type.
4 Separating equilibrium
Two-sided separating equilibrium. The following proposition shows that a separating equilib-
rium can be sustained where players behave as under complete information.
Proposition 1. A two-sided separating equilibrium (TSSE) can be supported in which the reg-






, and the incumbent





equilibrium can be sustained when the entrant￿ s o⁄-the-equilibrium beliefs ￿(cH
incjqL(sH
1 );sH
1 ) = ￿0






, for any production costs. If, in contrast, ￿0 < ￿1,




1 )), where the entrant solely relies on the regulator￿ s






1 ) = 0, deterring the entrant from the industry.
19The application of Cho and Kreps￿(1983) Intuitive Criterion to the setting we analyze, with two signals, follows
that in Schultz (1996, 1999). In particular, if the entrant observes an o⁄-the-equilibrium message, and such a message
is equilibrium dominated when the incumbent￿ s costs are high, but undominated when they are low, then the only
incumbent who could bene￿t from sending such an o⁄-the-equilibrium message is the low-cost ￿rm. As a consequence,
the entrant should believe that the incumbent￿ s costs must be low.
9this equilibrium exists if ￿rms￿costs are su¢ ciently asymmetric, i.e., cH





Let us ￿rst examine the case in which o⁄-the-equilibrium beliefs satisfy ￿0 ￿ ￿1. Hence, upon
observing contradictory signals (sH
1 ;qL(sH
1 )), the entrant￿ s beliefs prescribe that the incumbent￿ s
costs are likely high, thus attracting it to the industry. In this setting, the high-cost ￿rm cannot
deter entry by mimicking the output decision of the low-cost incumbent, qL(sH
1 ). Similarly, the
regulator does not deviate from equilibrium strategies, since the TSSE yields optimal output levels,
while deviations would entail ine¢ ciencies, and thus the TSSE can be sustained for all cost para-
meters. In contrast, when the entrant￿ s beliefs are relatively low, ￿0 < ￿1, the entrant responds
staying out after observing contradictory signals (sH
1 ;qL(sH
1 )). In this context, the high-cost incum-
bent could successfully deter entry by imitating the low-cost ￿rm, qL(sH
1 ), but such overproduction
e⁄ort becomes too costly when cH
inc > ￿, thus inducing the incumbent to behave as under complete
information.20
We next compare Proposition 1 with equilibrium results in signaling games without regulation.
When the costs of the high-type incumbent are relatively high, cH
inc > ￿, the low-cost incumbent
does not need to exert a separating e⁄ort, since the high-cost ￿rm cannot pro￿tably mimic its
output. Hence, equilibrium behavior coincides with that under complete information, both with
and without regulation. In contrast, when costs are relatively low, cH
inc ￿ ￿, the TSSE predicts
that players do not distort their complete information strategies, unlike models where the regulator
is absent, which prescribe an overproduction e⁄ort by the low-cost ￿rm. Despite such di⁄erence,
the separating equilibrium can be sustained under similar parameter conditions.21 In particular,
without regulator, the equilibrium can be supported when the costs of the high-type incumbent are
su¢ ciently low, i.e., cH
inc ￿ ￿; and under regulation, this strategy pro￿le arises if, in addition, the
entrant￿ s o⁄-the-equilibrium beliefs are su¢ ciently high, ￿0 ￿ ￿1.
Corollary 1 below compares equilibrium welfare relative to two benchmarks: that arising un-
der a complete information setting, and that in the separating equilibrium of a signaling game





SE denote social welfare in the separating equilibrium when the regulator is present (R), and
absent (NR), respectively. Similarly, let W
R;K
CI represent the welfare that emerges under complete
information with regulation.
Corollary 1. Social welfare in the TSSE, W
R;K
SE , coincides with that under complete infor-
mation, W
R;K




As suggested above, subsidy and output levels under the TSSE coincide with those in complete
information settings, thus yielding the same welfare level; a non-distortionary result similar to that
20Because unprejudiced beliefs allow for ￿
0 2 (0;1), this equilibrium result still holds when the entrant￿ s beliefs
upon observing contradictory signals approach zero or one, i.e., the entrant has a ￿prejudice￿in favor of the low- or
high-cost incumbent, respectively.
21Appendix 1 analyzes the separating equilibrium in a signaling game without regulation, and describes under
which conditions such equilibrium can be sustained.
10in models where the potential entrant observes signals originating from two incumbent ￿rms, such
as Bagwell and Ramey (1991) and Schultz (1999). However, unlike signaling models where the
regulator is absent, the presence of the regulator guarantees the production of the socially optimal
output qK





One-sided separating equilibrium. The following proposition shows that strategy pro￿les
in which only one agent, either the incumbent or the regulator, selects a type-dependent strategy,
cannot be sustained as equilibria in our model.
Proposition 2. One-sided separating equilibria (OSSE), in which the entrant observes only one
type-dependent strategy, originating from either the incumbent or the regulator, cannot be supported.
Figure 1a describes a strategy pro￿le in which the incumbent selects a type-independent out-






. In this case,
subsidies disseminate private information to the entrant.22 Hence, subsidies nullify the high-cost
incumbent￿ s incentives to select a type-independent output, since it cannot deter entry. There-
fore, this ￿rm would increase its ￿rst-period pro￿ts by deviating to qH(sH






cannot be supported as a OSSE.
Fig. 1a. Type-independent output. Fig. 1b. Type-independent subsidy.
Figure 1b depicts the case where the regulator chooses a type-independent subsidy s0
1, whereas






. The incumbent￿ s signal
now reveals information to the potential entrant, thus inhibiting the regulator￿ s concealing strategy.
22This result is independent on the precise output function that the incumbent chooses. Speci￿cally, if incumbent
selects a type-independent output q
L(s1), the regulator￿ s type-dependent subsidy would still allow the entrant to










1 )); thereby inhibiting
the concealment of information.
11The regulator facing a high-cost incumbent, thus, cannot deter entry by selecting s0
1, and could
increase social welfare by deviating towards sH
1 . As a consequence, this type of strategy pro￿le
cannot be sustained as a OSSE either.
5 Pooling equilibrium
In this section, we examine settings in which both regulator and incumbent choose a type-independent
strategy and, therefore, no information is conveyed to the entrant. To simplify the analysis of the
pooling equilibrium and its welfare comparisons, we hereafter assume no discounting.
Proposition 3. A pooling equilibrium can be supported in which the regulator selects a type-
independent subsidy sL
1, the incumbent responds with a type-independent output function qL(s1),





2(2￿￿) . In addition, for admissible entry costs DH
ent > F > DL
ent, F > F(￿) implies






2, and ￿ 2 [1=2;1] when ￿rms￿costs are relatively symmetric,
i.e., C1 ￿ cH










The high-cost incumbent exerts an overproduction e⁄ort in order to mimic the low-cost ￿rm,
raising its output function from qH(s1) to qL(s1) as depicted in ￿gure 2. The regulator, in addition,
chooses a type-independent subsidy sL
1, rather than that under complete information sH
1 , i.e., he
over-subsidizes. Hence, the entrant cannot infer the incumbent￿ s type, and stays out of the industry
given its low priors.23
Figure 2. Pooling equilibrium.
23Note that if, instead, the regulator chose a subsidy s
B
1 inducing the optimal output for this type of incumbent,
q
H
SO, the entrant would infer the incumbent￿ s cost and enter, thus eliminating the high-cost ￿rm￿ s incentives to
overproduce.
12Let us next examine the regulator￿ s incentives to set subsidy sL
1. On one hand, setting such
a suboptimal subsidy generates a welfare loss, since the induced output qL(sL
1) is larger than the
optimal output qH
SO. This welfare loss, however, becomes smaller as the regulator assigns a larger
weight on consumer surplus. On the other hand, the subsidy deters entry, thus entailing savings in
the entry costs, F, i.e., a welfare gain. Therefore, the regulator is willing to set sL
1 when the savings
in the entry costs are relatively large, i.e., F > F(￿). In this setting, the welfare gains o⁄set the
losses, ultimately yielding a larger social welfare than under complete information. Figure 3 depicts
the admissible set of entry costs, i.e., DH
ent > F > DL
ent in the shaded area, and superimposes cuto⁄
F(￿), thus identifying the region of entry costs for which the pooling equilibrium can be sustained.24
Intuitively, when the welfare loss from overproduction is relatively small (high ￿) and the savings in
entry costs are su¢ ciently large (high F), the regulator￿ s preferences for entry deterrence are aligned
with the incumbent￿ s. In this context, the regulator sets sL
1, which facilitates the incumbent￿ s entry-
deterring practices. Otherwise, the regulator assigns a small weight on consumer surplus, ￿ ￿ ￿,
and the welfare loss from overproduction generates large ine¢ ciencies. In this case, the regulator￿ s
and incumbent￿ s preferences are misaligned, since the former prefers to behave as under complete
information, setting a subsidy sH
1 , which ultimately attracts entry. The following corollary examines
how cost symmetry a⁄ects the emergence of the pooling equilibrium.
Figure 3. Cuto⁄ F(￿).
Corollary 2. When ￿rms￿costs are relatively symmetric, i.e., C2 > cH
inc, cuto⁄ ￿ satis￿es
￿ < 1=2 and, therefore, the pooling equilibrium can be supported for all values of ￿. In addition,
when C1 ￿ cH
inc > C2, cuto⁄ ￿ satis￿es ￿ 2 [1=2;1] and, hence, the pooling equilibrium exists for
24For presentation purposes, the ￿gure considers costs c
H
inc = 4=10 and c
L
inc = 0, and no discounting. Other
parameter combinations in the range of the admissible production costs described in Proposition 3 yield similar
results.
13all ￿ > ￿. Finally, when costs are asymmetric, i.e., cH
inc > C1, cuto⁄ ￿ satis￿es ￿ > 1, and the
pooling equilibrium cannot be sustained.
Corollary 2 shows that the pooling equilibrium can be sustained under larger parameter values
when ￿rms￿costs are symmetric. Figure 4 illustrates this result. Speci￿cally, the welfare loss that
arises from the incumbent￿ s mimicking e⁄ort diminishes as costs become more symmetric, thus
expanding the set of parameters under which this equilibrium can be supported. This result helps
us evaluate the e⁄ects of cost-reducing policies which, for instance, support relatively ine¢ cient
￿rms in their installation of new technologies. In particular, these policies would entail a reduction
in the cost asymmetry between ￿rms, ultimately facilitating the emergence of the entry-deterring
practices predicted by the pooling equilibrium. Let us next investigate if the presence of two signals
restricts the parameter values under which the pooling equilibrium can be sustained.
Fig. 4. Pooling PBE and cost symmetry.
Corollary 3. The set of production costs that support a pooling equilibrium when the regulator is
present, cH
inc ￿ C1, also sustains this equilibrium when he is absent, cH
inc ￿ CNR










Intuitively, the presence of two informed agents that can convey information, hinders the emer-
gence of pooling equilibria, relative to settings where a single player seeks to conceal information
from the entrant. The pooling equilibrium with and without regulator can be sustained only when
incumbent￿ s costs are relatively symmetric, i.e., cH
inc ￿ C1 and cH
inc ￿ CNR
PE . However, in models
where the regulator is absent, such symmetry condition arises because the high-cost incumbent is
only willing to mimic the output decision of the low-cost ￿rm when its overproduction e⁄ort is
14not very costly.25 When regulation is present, in contrast, this condition emerges because of the
ine¢ ciencies that the regulator must bear. Speci￿cally, he weighs the welfare loss that subsidy sL
1
entails (which increases in the cost asymmetry) against the savings in entry costs, thus leading
the regulator to select sL
1 only when ￿rms￿costs are relatively symmetric. The following corollary
compares the welfare arising in this equilibrium with that when the regulator is absent.26
Corollary 4. Social welfare in the pooling equilibrium when the regulator is present, W
R;K
PE , is
larger than that arising in signaling games where the regulator is absent, W
NR;K











. In addition, (1) when ￿rms￿costs are symmetric, i.e., C4 ￿ cH
inc,




PE holds for all values of ￿; (2) when costs
are C3 ￿ cH




PE for all ￿ ￿ e ￿; and
(3) for asymmetric costs, cH














Under no regulation, the pooling equilibrium prescribes that the high-cost incumbent, despite
increasing its production level to qL(0) in order to deter entry, still produces below the social
optimum, i.e., qL(0) < qH
SO. This underproduction pattern continues in the second-period game,
in which the incumbent produces its monopoly output x
H;NE
inc (0). In contrast, when regulation is
present, the incumbent produces a ￿rst-period output qL(sL
1), which exceeds the social optimum
qH





1 ) = xH
SO. Hence, if the weight on consumer surplus is high, the welfare loss aris-
ing from overproduction ￿ when the regulator is present￿ is smaller than that emerging from
underproduction ￿ when he is absent￿ which entails that regulation becomes welfare improving.
25Appendix 1 provides more details about the parameter conditions (i.e., cost asymmetry between the two types
of ￿rms) for which the pooling equilibrium can be sustained when the regulator is absent.
26Corollary 4 does not compare social welfare in the pooling equilibrium with that under complete information
since, for the pooling equilibrium to exist, it must yield a larger welfare level than in complete information.
15Fig. 5. Pooling PBE with and without regulator.
Corollary 4 also shows that, when ￿rms￿costs are symmetric, the welfare loss arising from
overproduction decreases and, hence, welfare is larger with than without regulator for all values of ￿,
i.e., the presence of the regulator is welfare improving. Figure 5 depicts this result. However, when
costs become more asymmetric, such welfare loss is more substantial, and the pooling equilibrium
entails a smaller welfare with than without regulator. In this context, the absence of regulation is,
hence, welfare superior.
In addition, our results suggest that the pooling equilibrium is unlikely to arise in industries
whose entry costs have experienced signi￿cant reductions, arising from technological or political
reasons. Only the separating equilibrium would emerge in this case, whereby subsidy policy coin-
cides with that under complete information, thus allowing the regulator to essentially ignore the
information context in which ￿rms operate. In contrast, if entry costs are high, the pooling equilib-
rium is more likely to arise. In this context, a regulator who ignored the information structure of
the game, behaving as under complete information, would yield a suboptimal welfare level, W
R;H
CI ,




Publicizing the incumbent￿ s costs. At the beginning of the game, an informed regulator could have
incentives to strategically disseminate information about the incumbent￿ s costs to potential entrants
by, for instance, publicizing its costs in di⁄erent media outlets. This action would transform the
information structure of the game, from one where the entrant is uninformed, to a game where all
agents are perfectly informed about the incumbent￿ s costs. Our results nonetheless suggest that the
regulator is not always willing to distribute such information. In particular, the regulator is only
16interested in publicizing information when his weight on consumer surplus is low and/or ￿rms￿costs
are relatively asymmetric. Speci￿cally, under these parameter conditions overall social welfare in
the complete information game exceeds that in the pooling equilibrium.27 Otherwise, the regulator
prefers to not publicize such information, thus supporting the incumbent￿ s concealment of its type
from the entrant, as predicted in the pooling equilibrium.28 A similar argument can be used to
evaluate the welfare consequences of distributing the statements, hearings, etc. of those Senate
and House committees which are in charge of designing subsidy policy. Our ￿ndings suggest that
regulators with interests that are misaligned with those of incumbent ￿rms would try to make this
information publicly available, thus hindering ￿rms￿entry-deterring practices. Regulators whose
preferences are aligned to the incumbent￿ s would, in contrast, limit the dissemination of such
information.
Regulation. Our results identify a strategic role of monopoly subsidies often overlooked by the
literature on monopoly regulation. In particular, a monopoly subsidy ￿ usually considered as a tool
to induce the incumbent produce the socially optimal output￿ provides additional entry-deterrence
bene￿ts, thus increasing the extent of the incumbent￿ s overproduction. The regulator anticipates
this behavior when designing his subsidy policy and, in certain cases, he may strategically support
the monopolist￿ s concealment of information, thus deterring entry. Our results do not imply,
however, that social welfare decreases by the presence of the regulator. In particular, while the
regulator can facilitate the monopolist ability to deter entry under certain cases, we show that his
presence can actually be welfare improving.
Distortionary taxation. Following Dixit and Kyle (1985), we consider that subsidies are raised
using non-distortionary taxes. If, instead, production subsidies are raised with distortionary taxes,
the social welfare function would include the deadweight loss from taxation, and the parameter
values sustaining our equilibrium predictions would be a⁄ected. In the separating equilibrium,
players behave as under complete information, but welfare levels would be lower than in our model.
In contrast, the over-subsidization result predicted by the pooling equilibrium would be ameliorated,
since the cost of raising public funds in this context is larger. Hence, this would ultimately shrink
the region of parameter values for which the regulator helps the incumbent to conceal its type from
the potential entrant.
Positive externalities. Our analysis can be easily extended to the regulation of products that
generate positive externalities, e.g., hybrid cars, solar panels, etc. In particular, regulation under
complete information would internalize the positive e⁄ects that these products generate, thus calling
for a higher optimal output than in our current study, and thus larger subsidies. Under the pooling
equilibrium, however, subsidies to this type of ￿rms would exceed the social optimum. Nonetheless,
27If, in contrast, parameter conditions support the emergence of the separating equilibrium, the regulator is in-
di⁄erent between distributing information or concealing it, since equilibrium behavior, and welfare, coincides under
both information contexts.
28Such context describes a strategic setting di⁄erent from that in our paper, since the regulator is allowed to
strategically choose whether or not to publicize the incumbent￿ s type before setting s1. Speci￿cally, the sheer decision
of the regulator of not distributing any information before the beginning of the game, suggests that he must be facing
a high-cost incumbent, since otherwise the regulator would have publicized the incumbent￿ s type.
17if such over-subsidization occurs, our results suggest that it would be welfare improving.
6 Conclusions
Our paper examines the incentives of incumbent and regulator to strategically convey or conceal
information about the incumbent￿ s costs, thereby a⁄ecting the entry of potential competitors in the
industry. We identify a new role for production subsidies, which not only promote larger output
levels under monopoly, but also o⁄er an information tool that potential entrants can use to assess
their prospects in the market. We provide welfare comparisons, showing that overall welfare in the
pooling equilibrium can be actually larger than in complete information settings if the regulator￿ s
and incumbent￿ s preferences are su¢ ciently aligned.
The model provides extensions to other ￿elds of economics. In particular, the monopolist￿ s ￿rst-
period actions do not generate externalities on other agents￿payo⁄s. In several settings, however,
governments use subsidies in order to promote (reduce) goods that impose positive (negative,
respectively) externalities. An extension allowing for the presence of externalities could be modeled,
for instance, by introducing the social bene￿t (or cost) of output in the regulator￿ s social welfare
function. Another venue of further research would consider contexts where the subsidy set in
the ￿rst period is in￿ exible across time, i.e., it cannot be revised at the beginning of the second-
period game. This regulatory setting describes countries whose legislative process is rigid, thus not
allowing the regulator to rapidly adjust his second-period policy. Such in￿ exibility could a⁄ect the
regulator￿ s willingness to increase subsidies, as prescribed in the pooling equilibrium, since such
subsidies would be permanent, thus imposing welfare e⁄ects across both periods.
7 Appendix
7.1 Appendix 1 - Separating and Pooling equilibrium without regulation
Separating PBE. In the absence of subsidy policy, the high-cost incumbent selects its complete-
information output qH rather than deviating towards the production level of the low-cost ￿rm,







Speci￿cally, note that output qL and qH in this context are not a function of subsidy s1 since
the regulator is absent. In contrast, the low-cost incumbent selects an output level qL;Sep > qL in



















inc(qL;Sep) = (1 ￿ qL;Sep)qL;Sep ￿ cH




, where qA (qB) solves C1 (C2, respectively) with equality. Applying the Cho
and Kreps￿(1987) Intuitive Criterion, it is straightforward to restrict the separating equilibrium













2(2￿￿) and qA > qL ￿
1￿cL
inc






Pooling PBE. In the absence of subsidy policy, the high-cost incumbent is willing to mimic
the low-cost ￿rm, i.e., selecting a ￿rst-period output qL, in order to deter entry if the following














for the low-cost ￿rm. The incentive compatibility condition for the low-cost incumbent holds since
by selecting qL it deters entry, and qL maximizes its ￿rst-period pro￿ts. The incentive compatibility
condition of the high-cost ￿rm, however, does not necessarily hold for all parameter values. In











4 . Hence, the high-cost incumbent￿ s incentive compatibility condition holds if
￿(1 ￿ cH






(9 + 4￿)(1 ￿ cH
inc)2
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5￿￿9 . (Note that for the parametric examples
considered throughout the paper, ￿ = 1 and cL
inc = 2=3, this cuto⁄ becomes cH
inc < 0:81.) Finally,
the entrant cannot update its beliefs after observing qL, and thus coincide with the prior probability
￿(cH







7.2 Proof of Lemma 1
No entry. Given a second-period subsidy s2, under no entry the K-type incumbent solves
max
xinc











2 . The social planner seeks to induce an





(1 ￿ xinc)xinc ￿ cK
incxinc
￿
19where CS(xinc) ￿ 1





2￿￿ . Hence, the subsidy s2 that induces the monopolist to produce xK





















< 0. (A similar subsidy,
sK
1 , is implemented in the ￿rst period, since the incumbent is the unique ￿rm operating in the
market.)










(1￿xent ￿xinc)xent ￿(cent ￿ s2)xent ￿F






3 for any ￿rm i = finc;entg where






(1 ￿ X)X ￿ cK
incX ￿ F
￿
where X ￿ xinc + xent, CS(X) ￿ 1
2(X)2. Note that the last expression considers the incumbent￿ s
marginal costs. This is due to the fact that, in order to allocate the production decision of the
socially optimal output, a benevolent social planner would select to produce using the most e¢ cient
￿rm. Speci￿cally, when the incumbent￿ s costs are low, all socially optimal output would be produced
by this ￿rm, whereas when they are high, incumbent and entrant are equally e¢ cient and hence
the socially optimal output can be split among them. Taking ￿rst-order conditions, we obtain




2￿￿ , which coincides with xK
SO. Finally, in order
to ￿nd subsidy s
K;E






































2￿￿ when the in-
cumbent￿ s costs are high, which is strictly positive if ￿ > 1
2. Substituting s
H;E
2 into the output
function x
K;E












2￿￿ . When ￿ < 1
2, s
H;E
2 = 0 and duopoly
output hence becomes x
H;E























< 0. Hence, the equilibrium output
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1 ￿ (2 ￿ ￿)cH
inc + (1 ￿ ￿)cL
inc
2(2 ￿ ￿)








2￿￿ ; see ￿gure A1 below.
Figure A1. Production costs when ￿ > 1
2.
In addition, the subsidy s
L;E






























when ￿ > 1
2, as depicted in the shaded area of the ￿gure below. ￿
7.3 Proof of Proposition 1
After observing the equilibrium subsidy sH
1 followed by output level qH(sH




1 ) = 1, and enters; while upon observing subsidy sL
1 followed by output level
qL(sL
1), the entrant believes ￿(cH
incjqL(sL
1);sL
1) = 0, and stays out. If, instead, the entrant observes
an o⁄-the-equilibrium subsidy s1 6= sH
1 ;sL
1 followed by an output level qK(s1), where K = fH;Lg,
he relies on the signal of the non-deviating player alone, and thus ￿(cH
incjqH(s1);s1) = 1 and
21￿(cH
incjqL(s1);s1) = 0. Similarly, if the entrant observes an equilibrium subsidy sK
1 followed by
an o⁄-the-equilibrium output level q(sK
1 ) 6= qH(sK
1 );qL(sK
1 ), he relies on the regulator￿ s subsidy
alone in order to infer the incumbent￿ s type, and his beliefs become ￿(cH
incjq(sH
1 );sH




1) = 0. Finally, if the deviating player selects the strategy corresponding to the other
type of incumbent, the entrant observes a subsidy sH
1 followed by output qL(sH
1 ). In this context,
the entrant cannot infer the incumbent￿ s type. In particular, he does not know if the deviation
is from the high-cost incumbent, who mimics the output function of the low-cost ￿rm, qL(s1), or
if the regulator (facing a low-cost incumbent) is mimicking the subsidy level of the high-cost ￿rm
in order to attract entry. These contradictory signals, induce beliefs of ￿(cH
incjqL(sH
1 );sH
1 ) = ￿0.


















Hence, for the TSSE to exist, neither the regulator nor the incumbent ￿nds pro￿table to send these
signals. Let us analyze these incentives separately for ￿0 ￿ ￿1 and ￿0 < ￿1.
Case 1: ￿0 ￿ ￿1. The entrant￿ s beliefs hence do not allow the high-cost incumbent to deter
entry. Conditional on entry, and upon observing the equilibrium subsidy sH
1 , the incumbent has
no incentives to deviate from qH(sH
1 ) to qL(sH
1 ). In this setting, the regulator facing a low-cost
incumbent has no incentives to deviate from sL
1 (which deters entry) to sH
1 (which attracts entry
since ￿0 ￿ ￿1). In particular, in the ￿rst period, subsidy sH




SO, thus generating ine¢ ciencies. In addition, in the second period, the regulator
provides subsidy s
L;E
2 to the high-cost entrant and the low-cost incumbent, which induces positive
output levels from both ￿rms, and a socially optimal production at the aggregate level. However,
the ￿rst-period ine¢ ciency does not arise if the regulator selects equilibrium subsidy sL
1. Hence,
the regulator does not have incentives to deviate.
Case 2: ￿0 < ￿1. The entrant responds staying out after observing subsidy sH
1 followed by
output qL(sH
1 ). For the TSSE to exist, the high-cost incumbent, upon observing the equilibrium
subsidy sH
1 , must have no incentives to deviate from qH(sH
1 ) to qL(sH
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(2￿￿)2 , where M
H
inc is evaluated at s
H;NE




4(2￿￿)2 , which is
evaluated at s
H;E
2 > 0 given that ￿ > 1






3￿+2￿￿ ￿ ￿. In
addition, cuto⁄ ￿ satis￿es ￿ <
1+(1￿￿)cL
inc










2￿￿, for all ￿ 2 [1=2;1], and reaches cH
inc = 1 when cL
inc = 1. Hence, condition
cH





inc. In this setting, the
22regulator facing a low-cost incumbent must have no incentives to deviate from sL
1 (which induces
socially optimal output and deters entry) to sH
1 (which induces an ine¢ cient output level and also
deters entry since ￿0 < ￿1). ￿
7.4 Proof of Corollary 1











in the TSSE coincides with that under complete
information, socially optimal output levels are induced in both information settings, thus yielding
the same social welfare.
TSSE equilibrium vs Signaling model without regulator. The second-period welfare is larger
under the TSSE equilibrium where the regulator is present than in the separating equilibrium
where he is absent, since the socially optimal output qL
SO is being produced. Regarding the ￿rst-
period welfare, note that the regulator also induces a socially optimal output qL
SO = qH(sH
1 ) which
yields a larger social welfare than that arising when the regulator is absent. Similarly, when the
incumbent￿ s costs are high, the regulator induces socially optimal output levels, qH
SO, yielding a
overall larger social welfare than when the regulator is absent. ￿
7.5 Proof of Proposition 2
Type-independent output. Let us ￿rst analyze OSSE when the incumbent selects a type-independent
output function q(s1) 6= qH(s1);qL(s1) while the regulator chooses a type-dependent subsidy
(sH
1 ;sL
1). In this case, after observing the equilibrium subsidy sH
1 followed by output level q(sH
1 ),
the entrant believes ￿(cH
incjq(sH
1 );sH
1 ) = 1, and enters; while upon observing subsidy sL
1 followed
by output level q(sL
1), the entrant believes ￿(cH
incjq(sL
1);sL
1) = 0, and stays out. Hence, if the high-
cost incumbent deviates to qH(sH
1 ), entry will still occur, while his ￿rst-period pro￿ts increase.
Therefore, this type of incumbent does not have incentives to behave according to the prescribed
strategy. A similar argument applies if the incumbent selects a type-independent output func-
tion qL(s1). In particular, the entrant￿ s equilibrium beliefs would be ￿(cH
incjqL(sH
1 );sH




1) = 0, thus allowing the entrant to still infer the incumbent￿ s type even in the







Type-independent subsidy. Let us next examine the OSSE in which the regulator chooses a type-
independent subsidy s1 6= sH
1 ;sL




. In this context, the entrant, upon observing the equilibrium subsidy s1 followed by
equilibrium output level qH(s1), infers the incumbent￿ s costs being high, i.e., ￿(cH
incjqH(s1);s1) = 1,
and enters. If the entrant observes equilibrium subsidy s1 followed by equilibrium output level
qL(s1), he also infers the incumbent￿ s type, i.e., ￿(cH
incjqL(s1);s1) = 0, and stays out. A regulator
facing a low-cost incumbent, however, has incentives to deviate from this strategy pro￿le. Specif-
ically, if he deviates to sL
1 6= s1 and output level is qL(sL
1), entry is still deterred, and ￿rst-period
output coincides with the social optimum, i.e., qL(sL
1) = qL
SO. Hence, this strategy pro￿le cannot
be sustained as a OSSE. A similar argument applies to the case in which the regulator selects a
23type-independent sL







In this environment, the regulator facing a high-cost incumbent has incentives to deviate towards
sH






, can still infer that the incumbent￿ s type is high,
thus entering. Given that such a deviation entails an optimal output, i.e., qH(sH
1 ) = qH
SO unlike
qH(sL
1), this strategy pro￿le cannot be sustained as a OSSE. ￿
7.6 Proof of Proposition 3
In the pooling strategy pro￿le, the regulator sets a type-independent subsidy s0
1 and the incum-
bent responds with a type-independent ￿rst-period output function q(s1) for any subsidy s1.
After observing equilibrium subsidy s0
1 and output level q(s0




1) = p, which coincide with the prior probability distribution. After observing a devi-
ation from the regulator s00
1 6= s0
1, the entrant￿ s o⁄-the-equilibrium beliefs cannot be updated using
Bayes￿rule, and for simplicity, we assume that ￿(cH
incjq(s00
1);s00
1) = 1. A similar argument can be
made in the case when only the incumbent deviates towards an output q0(s0
1) 6= q(s0
1) while the









Therefore, after observing an equilibrium subsidy s0
1 and an equilibrium output level q(s0
1), the
entrant enters if its expected pro￿t from entering satis￿es p ￿ DH
ent + (1 ￿ p) ￿ DL







￿ p, where p 2 (0;1) by de￿nition. Hence, if p > p entry occurs; otherwise the
entrant stays out. Note that if p > p, entry occurs when s0
1 and q(s0
1) are selected, which cannot be




1) this strategy cannot be a pooling equilibrium. Thus, it must be that p ￿ p,
inducing the entrant to stay out.
Incumbent. Let us check the conditions under which the high-cost incumbent chooses output
function q(s1). After observing an equilibrium subsidy of s0






inc. If, instead, the incumbent deviates towards an o⁄-the-equilibrium output
q0(s0
1) 6= q(s0




inc, which are maximized
at q0(s0
1) = qH(s0





































observing an o⁄-the-equilibrium subsidy s00
1 6= s0
1, entry ensues regardless of the incumbent￿ s output








inc cannot hold by de￿nition.
Similarly for the low-cost incumbent. If, after observing equilibrium subsidy s0
1, it selects equilib-
rium output level q(s0





inc. However, if it deviates towards q0(s0
1)




inc, which are maximized at q0(s0
1) = qL(s0
1).


























After observing an o⁄-the-equilibrium subsidy s00
1 6= s0
1, entry ensues regardless of the incumbent￿ s
output function, and therefore, q(s00
1) is not optimal for the low-cost ￿rm.
Regulator. Let us now examine the regulator￿ s incentives to choose a type-independent subsidy
s0
1. When the incumbent￿ s costs are high, the regulator obtains SWH;NE(s0
1;s
H;NE
2 ) by selecting s0
1.
If, instead, he deviates to any o⁄-the-equilibrium subsidy s00
1 6= s0
1, the incumbent selects qH(s00
1) and
entry ensues. Hence, he obtains SWH;E(s00
1;s
H;E
2 ), which is maximized at the complete information
subsidy s00
1 = sH



















2 ) by selecting the type-independent subsidy s0
1. If instead, he deviates
to s00
1, the incumbent selects qL(s00


























1 , where sA
1 > sL
1,



















2￿￿ . Therefore, the
subsidy s0




1 . Summarizing, any subsidy s0
1 and
output function q(s1) simultaneously satisfying conditions C3-C5 constitutes a pooling equilibrium
of the signaling game.
Intuitive Criterion. We next show that the type-independent output function q(s1) = qL(s1)
survives the Cho and Kreps￿(1987) Intuitive Criterion, and then demonstrate that, given this
output function, only the type-independent subsidy s0
1 = sL
1 survives this equilibrium re￿nement.
Incumbent, case 1a. Let us ￿rst check if the type-independent ￿rst-period output function
q(s1) < qL(s1) survives the Cho and Kreps￿(1987) Intuitive Criterion for any s1. For simplicity,
we ￿rst analyze the case where q(s1) < qH(s1) < qL(s1) and then that in which qH(s1) < q(s1) <
qL(s1). On one hand, the highest pro￿t that the low-cost incumbent obtains by deviating towards
q0(s1) 6= q(s1) is ML
inc(q0(s1);s1) + ￿M
L








other hand, the high-cost incumbent obtains MH
inc(q(s1);s1) + ￿M
H
inc in equilibrium. If instead, it
deviates towards q0(s1) 6= q(s1), MH
inc(q0(s1);s1) + ￿M
H
inc is the highest pro￿t that it can obtain,






= 0 after observing a deviation q0(s1) 2 (qH(s1);qL(s1)). (Otherwise, the
25entrant￿ s beliefs are una⁄ected; since either both types of incumbent, or neither, have incentives
to deviate.) Therefore, after observing a deviation q0(s1) 2 (qH(s1);qL(s1)), the entrant believes
that the incumbent￿ s cost must be low, and does not enter. Under these updated beliefs, the pro￿t
obtained by the low-cost incumbent from deviating exceeds its equilibrium pro￿ts. Hence, the
low-cost incumbent deviates towards q0(s1) and the pooling PBE where q(s1) < qH(s1) < qL(s1)
violates the Intuitive Criterion for any subsidy s1.
Let us now examine the case where the equilibrium output function q(s1) satis￿es qH(s1) <
q(s1) < qL(s1). On one hand, the highest pro￿t that the low-cost incumbent can obtain by
deviating towards q0(s1) 6= q(s1) is ML
inc(q0(s1);s1)+￿M
L




inc for any q0(s1) 2 (q(s1);qL(s1)]. On the other hand, the highest pro￿t that




which exceeds its equilibrium pro￿t of MH
inc(q(s1);s1) + ￿M
H
inc for any q0(s1) 2 [qH(s1);q(s1)).
Therefore, after observing any deviation q0(s1) 2 (q(s1);qL(s1)], the entrant believes that the
incumbent￿ s costs must be low, and does not enter. Under these updated beliefs, the pro￿t that
the low-cost incumbent obtains deviating exceeds its equilibrium pro￿ts. Hence, the pooling PBE
where q(s1) < qL(s1) also violates the Intuitive Criterion.
Incumbent, case 1b. Next let us check if the type-independent ￿rst-period output q(s1) >








inc is the highest pro￿t it can obtain, which exceeds its equilibrium pro￿ts.
On the other hand, the high-cost incumbent obtains MH
inc(q(s1);s1) + ￿M
H
inc in equilibrium. By
deviating towards qL(s1), MH
inc(qL(s1);s1) + ￿M
H
inc is the highest pro￿t it obtains after no entry,
which also exceeds its equilibrium pro￿ts, given that qH(s1) < qL(s1) < q(s1). Therefore, both






= p inducing no entry. Given these beliefs, both types of incumbent
deviate toward qL(s1), obtaining higher pro￿ts than in equilibrium. Hence, the pooling PBE in
which both types select q(s1) > qL(s1) also violates the Intuitive Criterion.
Incumbent, case 1c. Let us now check if the type-independent ￿rst-period output q(s1) =




is the highest payo⁄ the low-cost incumbent obtains by deviating towards q0(s1) 6= qL(s1), which
lies below its equilibrium pro￿ts since ML
inc(q0(s1);s1) + ￿M
L
inc reaches its maximum at exactly
q0(s1) = qL(s1). Hence, the low-cost incumbent does not have incentives to deviate from the




is the highest payo⁄ the high-cost incumbent can obtain by deviating toward q0(s1) 6= qL(s1).







inc, which only holds for deviations closer to its ￿rst-period pro￿t-maximizing
output, i.e., q0(s1) 2 [qH(s1);qL(s1)). Hence, the entrant believes with certainty the incumbent is





= 1, and enters. In contrast,
its updated beliefs are una⁄ected after observing any other deviation. The high-cost incumbent￿ s
26pro￿ts from deviating towards q0(s1) are hence MH
inc(q0(s1);s1) + ￿DH








Note that deviation pro￿ts, MH
inc(q0(s1);s1)+￿DH
inc, are maximal at q0(s1) = qH(s1), yielding pro￿ts
of MH
inc(qH(s1);s1) + ￿DH






condition C6 holds for all deviations q0(s1) 2 [qH(s1);qL(s1)). Note that the last inequality holds
since the equilibrium output function q(s1) = qL(s1) satis￿es condition C3. Therefore, the high-
cost incumbent does not have incentives to deviate from qL(s1), and the type-independent output
function qL(s1) must be part of a pooling equilibrium surviving the Intuitive Criterion.
Regulator, case 2a. Given output function qL(s1) selected by both types of incumbent, let
us ￿nally analyze the regulator￿ s equilibrium subsidy s0
1. First, consider the case where s0
1 <
sL
1. For simplicity, we analyze the case where sH
1 < s0
1 < sL













2 ) is the highest




2 ) ￿ SWL;NE(s0
1;s
L;NE
2 ), since sL
1 maximizes social welfare conditional on no










2 ) is the highest payo⁄ that the regulator obtains when entry is deterred, which
does not exceed his equilibrium welfare since SWH;NE(sL
1;s
H;NE







1. Therefore, after observing a deviation sL
1 6= s0
1, the entrant believes that the
incumbent￿ s cost must be low, and does not enter. Hence, the regulator facing a low-cost incumbent
deviates towards sL





1 violates the Intuitive Criterion.
Second, let us now consider the case where s0
1 < sH
1 < sL
1. On one hand, the regulator facing
a low-cost incumbent obtains an equilibrium social welfare of SWL;NE(s0
1;s
L;NE
2 ). By deviating





2 ) is the highest payo⁄that the
regulator obtains, which exceeds equilibrium welfare if SWL;NE(s00
1;s
L;NE








1 maximizes social welfare conditional on no en-










2 ) is the highest payo⁄that the regulator obtains, which exceeds equilibrium wel-
fare for all s00
1 2 (s0
1;sH
1 ]. Therefore, after observing a deviation s00
1 2 (sH
1 ;sL
1], the entrant believes
that the incumbent￿ s cost must be low, and does not enter. Under these updated beliefs, the social
welfare from deviating to s00
1 2 (sH
1 ;sL




the regulator facing a low-cost incumbent deviates towards s00
1 and the pooling PBE in which the




1, also violates the Intuitive
27Criterion.








2 ). By deviating towards an o⁄-the-equilibrium subsidy of sL
1 6= s0
1











2 ). On the other hand, the regulator facing a high-cost incumbent obtains an
equilibrium social welfare of SWH;NE(s0
1;s
H;NE






2 ) is the highest payo⁄that the regulator obtains, which exceeds
his equilibrium welfare since SWH;NE(sL
1;s
H;NE
2 ) ￿ SWH;NE(s0
1;s
H;NE




Therefore, the regulator has incentives to deviate towards sL
1 for both types of incumbent and the







= p inducing no entry since p < p.
Given these beliefs, the regulator has incentives to deviate toward sL
1, obtaining higher social wel-
fare than in equilibrium. Hence, the pooling strategy pro￿le where the regulator selects s0
1 > sL
1
also violates the Intuitive Criterion.




1. On one hand, the regulator facing a low-cost incumbent obtains an equilib-
rium social welfare of SWL;NE(sL
1;s
L;NE
2 ). By deviating towards an o⁄-the-equilibrium sub-
sidy of s00
1 6= sL
1 the highest payo⁄ that the regulator can obtain occurs when entry is deterred,
yielding welfare of SWL;NE(s00
1;s
L;NE




2 ). On the other hand, the regulator facing a high-cost incumbent obtains an
equilibrium social welfare of SWH;NE(sL
1;s
H;NE






2 ) is the highest payo⁄ that the regulator obtains, which
exceeds the equilibrium welfare if SWH;NE(s00
1;s
H;NE
2 ) ￿ SWH;NE(sL
1;s
H;NE















= 1, and entry ensues. Given these updated
beliefs, the social welfare that the regulator facing a high-cost incumbent obtains when he devi-








2 ) < SWH;NE(sL
1;s
H;NE
2 ). This condition holds since, according to condition C5a,
the equilibrium subsidy sL
1 must satisfy SWH;E(sH
1 ;s
H;E
2 ) < SWH;NE(sL
1;s
H;NE




2 ) < SWH;E(sH
1 ;s
H;E
2 ) < SWH;NE(sL
1;s
H;NE




2 ). Therefore, the regulator facing a high-cost incumbent does not have incentives
to deviate either, and the pooling PBE where the regulator selects sL
1 survives the Intuitive Crite-
rion.
Hence, at the equilibrium subsidies of sL
1 and s
H;E
2 , the high-cost incumbent overproduces,
selecting a ￿rst-period output function qL(s1), if condition C3 holds, which implies that cH
inc satis￿es
cH






(2￿￿)2￿3￿ . However, for the set of production costs
considered in the paper, e C > cH
inc > cL
inc, where e C ￿
1+(1￿￿)cL
inc
2￿￿ , cuto⁄ C￿ satis￿es C￿ > e C. In
particular, the vertical intercept of cuto⁄ C￿ lies above that of e C, and both cuto⁄s reach cH
inc = 1
28when cL
inc = 1, implying that C￿ > e C. Hence, condition cH
inc < C￿ is not binding in the pooling
equilibrium for the admissible set of production costs e C > cH
inc > cL
inc.




1 + ￿ + ￿(cH
inc)2 ￿ 2cH




while when selecting subsidy sH
1 , which is responded with output level qH(sH
1 ), thus attracting
entry, welfare is SWH;E(sH
1 ;s
H;E
2 ), which coincides with that arising under complete information,
that is







2 ) ￿ SWH;E(sH
1 ;s
H;E




2(2￿￿)￿ ￿ F(￿), which is in-
creasing in ￿. Hence, among the set of admissible entry costs DH
ent > F > DL
ent, the pooling equilib-





￿ > ￿, where ￿ solves DH







￿ < 1 for all cH








inc = 1 when cL
inc = 1. Hence, cuto⁄ C1 satis￿es C1 >
1+(1￿￿)cL
inc
2￿￿ ￿ e C, since e C
originates at 1











2 ￿ C2. Furthermore, cuto⁄ C2 satis￿es C2 < e C. Speci￿cally, both
C2 and e C are linear in cL
inc and reach cH
inc = 1 when cL
inc = 1. However, cuto⁄ C2 originates at
p
3￿1
2 ’ 0:36 while e C originates at 1





7.7 Proof of Corollary 2
From the proof of Proposition 3, we obtain a complete ranking of cuto⁄s in the (cH
inc;cL
inc)-space:
e C > C1 > C2, and the pooling equilibrium exists for all cH
inc ￿ C1. Hence, we can identify three
regions of costs (for a graphical reference, see ￿gure 4 in the text): (1) for cH
inc > C1, cuto⁄ ￿
lies above 1 and, hence, the pooling equilibrium cannot be sustained; (2) for costs in the interval
C1 ￿ cH




and the pooling equilibrium exists for all ￿ > ￿; and (3)
for costs C2 ￿ cH
inc, cuto⁄￿ lies below 1=2 and, therefore, the pooling equilibrium can be supported
for all values of ￿. ￿
7.8 Proof of Corollary 3















PE after considering no discounting,
where cuto⁄CNR
PE > C1, since CNR
PE originates at 3
p
5￿5
4 ’ 0:427, while C1 does at 0:41, and reaches
cH
inc = 1 at cL
inc = 1. Hence, the pooling equilibrium can be sustained in the region cH
inc ￿ CNR
PE
without regulation, and in the subregion cH
inc ￿ C1 < CNR
PE with regulation. In other words, for
29all costs under which the pooling equilibrium exists when the regulator is present, this equilibrium
can also be sustained when the regulator is absent.
7.9 Proof of Corollary 4




(2 + ￿)(1 ￿ cH
inc)2 + ￿(1 ￿ cL

























. In addition, cuto⁄ e ￿ satis￿es
e ￿ < 1 for all cH




inc. Let us now compare cuto⁄ C3 with
the region of costs under which the pooling equilibrium can be sustained, i.e., C1 ￿ cH
inc (costs
entailing that ￿ < 1). In particular, cuto⁄ C3 lies below C1, since they are both linear in cL
inc,
and reach cH
inc = 1 at cL
inc = 1, but cuto⁄ C3 originates at 3 ￿
p
7 ’ 0:35 while C1 starts at 0:41.
Cuto⁄ C3 also lies below C2, since the latter originates at 0:36. Therefore, within the region of
costs supporting the pooling equilibrium, i.e., C1 ￿ cH
inc, social welfare with regulation is larger
than without in the subregion C1 ￿ C3 ￿ cH
inc. For completeness, note that cuto⁄ e ￿ > 1=2 for all
cH




inc. Comparing this cuto⁄ with those analyzed above,
note that C4 also reaches cH
inc = 1 at cL
inc = 1, but originates at 5 ￿
p
23 ’ 0:20, below all other
cuto⁄s. Hence, (1) for costs in C1 ￿ cH
inc > C3, cuto⁄ e ￿ satis￿es e ￿ > 1 and, hence, the pooling
equilibrium exists but it yields a lower welfare with than without regulator; (2) for costs in the
interval C3 ￿ cH
inc > C4, cuto⁄ e ￿ satis￿es e ￿ 2 [1=2;1] and, thus, the pooling equilibrium exists and
yields a larger welfare with than without regulator for all ￿ ￿ e ￿; and (3) for costs C4 ￿ cH
inc, cuto⁄
e ￿ satis￿es e ￿ < 1=2 and, therefore, the pooling equilibrium exists and yields a larger welfare with
than without regulator for all values of ￿. ￿
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